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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
1. 
Salt Lake City Was Nnt a Proper Party to this Action. The 
Sustaining of its Demurre'r Was Correct. 
A. The validity of the zoning provisions of 1Salt 
Lake City's ordinance is not in issue in this action. 
The Plaintiff and Interveners are not questioning their 
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validity. In fact, they claim their benefits. Without the 
restrictions contained in the ordinance they would not 
be in court. They assert that the ordinance protects 
their properties and they are asking that the ·ordinance 
be literally enforced. rrhe Respondents do not question 
the validity of the ordinance. Respondent, Tracy 
Loan and Trust Company, recognized its binding force 
in appealing to the Board of Adjustment for a variation. 
Therefore all parties are before the Court recognizing 
the validity of the zoning legislation (except Appellants 
question the validity and powers of the Board of Adjust-
ment) insofar as its ''use'' provisions are concerned. 
B. Salt Lake City, as an arm of the State govern-
ment, is not complaining of the action ·Of the Board of 
Adjustment; hence 1Sec. 15-8-104 R. S. 1933 is not rele-
vant. Salt Lake City has no grievance to present to the 
Court. rrhe grievances are those of Appellants. Salt 
Lake City, as a municipal corporation, cannot correct 
the errors of the Board of Adjustment, if any were com-
mitted. This is a duty of the Courts. The Board of 
City Commissioners has no authority to set aside the 
Findings and Order of the .Board of Adjustment in this 
case. 
C. Salt Lake City, as a municipal corporation and 
therefore an arm of the State, is not called upon in this 
action to defend its zoning ordinance. The power of 
its Board of City Commissioners to enact it is not ques-
tioned by any of the parties to this action; in fact, all of 
the parties either assert or admit this power existed 
and now exists. 
3 
D. The absence of Salt Lake City as a municipal 
corporation from this action does not hinder nor limit 
the Courts in controlling the Board of Adjustment. The 
presence of the City would not in any respect increase 
the Court's authority or add to the effectiveness of its 
judgment. 
The District Court was correct in sustaining the 
demurrer of Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation. 
2. 
The Board of Adjustment Is a Proper Party Defendant. It 
Had the Right to Participate in the Trial of the 
Plenary Action in th:e District Court; To Present Evi-
dence and Cross-Examine Appellants' Witnesses. 
A. The Appellants are estopped to question the 
presence of the Board of Adjustment in this action. It 
was brought bef,ore the District Court at the instance 
.of Appellants. The Board did not intervene nor appear 
in the plenary action voluntarily. The members thereof 
were summoned to appear under proper process of the 
Court. They complied with the demand. 
B. 'rhe Board of Adjustment having been made a 
party to the plenary action, had a right to file an answer 
to plaintiff's and intervener's complaints and partici-
pate in the trial. Even if the Board is not a necessary 
party, it is certainly a proper party. Since when has 
a proper party defendant been debarred from participa-
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tion in the trial when he is brought before the Court by 
action of the opposite party? 
70 Corpus Juris 611 ; 
State vs. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296; 
259 Pac. 1044; 54 A. L. R. 1463; 
Taylor vs. Lytle, 141 Pac. (Idaho) at pg. 94. 
C. But the Board ·of Adjustment is a necessary 
party to the plenary action. It is charged with the 
performance of important duties and exercises import-
ant functions both under the zoning statute of the State 
and zoning Ordinance of the City, Section 15-8-101, R. S. 
1933. Public officers charged with performance of duties 
or exercising power and authority under a law or a city 
ordinance must be brought before the Court and are 
entitled to partieipate in the trial of the issues. 
Skagit County vs. Northern Pacific Hail way 
Co., 61 Fed. (2nd) 6:38; 86 A. L. R. 1012. 
D. Miles vs. McKinney, 199 Atlantic (Maryland) 
540 at pg. 543 is not in point because: 
(a) The l\laryland zoning law did not pro-
vide for a plenary action in court to review the 
action of the Board of Adjustment as does the 
Utah ~Statute. 
(b) The Board of Adjustment attempted 
an appeal from the trial court's judgment to the 
Appellate Court. It was the moving party. It 
attempted to overthrow its own decision. 
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3. 
The Function of the Dish"ict Court in the Trial of the 
Plenary Action under Section 15-8-104, R. S. 1933 Is 
to Determine if the, Action of the Board of Adjustment 
Was Capricious or Arbitrary and Whether or Not the 
Action of the Board in Granting or Denying a Vari-
ance from the Zoning Ordinance Was a Reasonable 
Exercise of the Discretion Vested in It by Law. 
A. Section 15-8-108 R. S. 1933 provides: 
''The city or any person aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of adjustment or zoning 
commission may have and maintain a plenary 
action for relief therefrom in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction.'' 
This method of reviewing the order of the Board of 
Adjustment in granting or denying a variance appears 
to be a unique feature of the Utah statute. Ordinarily 
the method of judicial review is either by the writ of 
review or certiorari. Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning 257. 
We have not, after exhaustive search, been able to find a 
corresponding provision in the zoning law of any other 
jurisdiction. 
What is meant by the term "plenary action" as 
used in this section? The text books and encyclopedias, 
and even the court decisions are singularly silent in 
defining "plenary action". The best and about the 
only definition we have been able to discover is con-
6 
tained in Central Republic Bank and Trust Co. vs. Cald-
well, 58 Fed. (2nd) 732: 
''The main characteristic differences between 
a summary proceeding and a plenary suit are: 
the :former is based upon petition and proceeds 
without formal pleadings; the latter proceeds 
upon formal pleadings. In the former, the nec-
essary parties are cited in by order to show cause; 
in the latter, formal summons brings in the par-
ties other than plaintiff. In the former, short 
time notice is fixed by the court; in the latter, 
time for pleading and hearing is fixed by statute 
or rule of court. In the former, the hearing is 
quite generally upon affidavits; in the latter, ex-
amination of witnesses is the usual method. In 
the former, the hearing is sometimes ex parte; 
in the latter a full hearing is had." 
Webster's New International Dictionary defines 
"plenary" as: "full, entire, complete, absolute, unqual-
ified; fully attended or constituted; including all entitled 
to be present; having full powers." 
It is submitted that the legislature in using the term 
"plenary action" in section 15-8-108 R. S. 1933, intended 
to provide a method of review of the order of the Board 
of Adjustment which would be conducted in the District 
Court with all of the propriety and formality of an 
action commenced and prosecuted in said Court under 
the Code of Civil Pr•ocedure. The defendants must be 
served with summons; there must be formal pleadings 
resulting in issues; there must be a formal trial, with 
witnesses examined and cross examined in open court; 
the rules of evidence shall apply; there must result 
7 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment. 
All of these requirements were met in the instant case. 
All necessary and proper parties were before the Court 
represented by counsel. All ·of the mandatory formal-
ities of a "trial" were obeyed. The aggrieved parties 
had and maintained their "plenary action for relief" 
from the "decision of the Board of Adjustment". 
B. The statute is silent as to the duty of the Court 
in reviewing or passing upon the "decision of the Board 
of Adjustment". It is given no rule for guidance. 
Nothing is said as to what it shall finally do with the 
order of the Board. All is left to implication. May it 
affirm it; set it aside; modify it7 If after hearing all of 
the evidence, the conclusion of the Court coincides with 
that •of the Board, does the Court simply affirm the order 
of the Board, or does it enter its own judgment on the 
facts, substituting its own conclusion for that of the 
Board f If the Court disagrees with the Board, does it 
simply nullify the Board's order or does the Oourt sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the Board 1 If it 
agrees in part with the Board's order and disagrees 
as to other of its features, does the Court modify the 
Board's order and as modified, affirm the order, or does 
it entirely nullify the order and substitute its own judg-
ment in lieu thereof? These are some of the provoking 
questions which the statute does not answer. It is evi-
dently left for the Courts to interpret the provisions of 
Section 15-8-104 in the light of precedents and practice 
adopted by Courts in reviewing orders and decisions of 
administrative boards. It is the duty of the Court, using 
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this section, as its authority, to formulate a modus 
operandi in reviewing the ''decisions of the Board of 
Adjustment.'' 
C. It is granted that the method of review of the 
decision of the Board ,of Adjustment as prescribed by the 
Utah statute is distinctive and that the decision of other 
jurisdictions on this subject may be but informatory 
rather than carrying the weight of binding judicial pre-
cedents. Yet it is submitted that there are certain basic 
principles of judicial review of administrative orders 
and decisions which are cogent and should be adopted. 
It is a rather wild surmise to conclude that the legis-
lature after setting up the rather elaborate machinery 
of the Board of Adjustment and defining its authority 
with care, intended to confer upon the Courts such com-
plete power over zoning variances as to abrogate, ob-
literate and render valueless the decision of the Board 
once an aggrieved party has appealed to the Courts. If 
such is the 0orrect conclusion, why should the Board 
of Adjustment have been created 1 Why did not the 
legislature provide that any person, believing the literal 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance in a particular case 
resulted in unnecessary hardship to him, "may have and 
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction 1" It would seem 
sensible to conclude that the legislature intended that the 
Board's decision should have some weight on judicial 
review and that the findings of the Board are entitled 
to 'some oonsideration by the Court. To hold that once 
the matter is before the Court in the "plenary action" 
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the Board's decision is without weight or value, charges 
the legislature with wholly disregarding certain well 
established rules and practices in the judicial review of 
administrative board decisions in zoning cases. We can-
not believe the legislature intended to ignore them. 
It certainly intended that the Courts possess com-
plete power to review the decisions of the Board of 
Adjustment and to such process this counsel heartily 
subscribes. He does not like the idea of giving adminis-
trative boards' rulings and orders such ''peculiar sanc-
tity" as is attempted to be acoorded them in recent 
Federal legislation. This type of legislation represents 
the one extreme. 'l_1he other extreme is to give such 
orders and decisions no weight or value. Neither ex-
treme accords with the underlying necessity calling such 
boards or commissions into being, nor the legal principles 
upholding their existence. 
"As civilization becomes more complex * * * 
the government must abandon the system of un-
conditional commands and res·ort to conditional 
commands which vest in the administrative offices 
larger powers of a discretionary character." 
Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, Principles of Ad-
ministrative Law of the U. S. (1905) 
324. 
"Congress legislated on the subject as far as 
was reasonably practicable, and from the neces-
sities ·of the case was compelled to leave to ex-
ecutive officers the duty of bringing about the 
result pointed out by the statute. To deny the 
power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, 
in effect, amount but to declaring that the plenary 
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power vested in Congress to regulate foreign com-
merce 0ould not be efficaciously exerted.'' 
Butterfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470. 
"The appropriate questions for the court 
would be whether the commission acted within 
the authority conferred by the legislature, and 
also, so far as the amount of compensation per-
mitted by the prescribed rates is concerned, 
whether the commission went beyond the domain 
of the state's legislative power and violated the 
constitutional rights of property by imposing con-
fiscatory requirements.'' 
Louisville & N. R. R. vs. Garrett, 
231 U. ~s. 298, 313; 58 Law Ed. 229, 243. 
"Manifestly the legislative body cannot fix 
any adequate standard or rule, that would fit 
every individual C'ase of hardship. That is im-
possible; and therefore the let,rislative body has 
confined the determination of that feature to an 
administrative agency-in this case the board of 
appeals-as a fact finding body which could de-
termine whether in any specific case unusual hard-
ship might result if the strict letter of the or-
dinance were complied with. 
L. and M. Investment Co. vs. Cutler, 
125 Ohio State 12; 180 N. E. 379. 
It would therefore seem logical to conclude that the 
order or decision of the Board of Adjustment must have 
some weight on the trial of the "plenary action". It 
is not to be entirely disregarded nor is it to be given 
unreasonable value. There is a happy middle ground, 
based upon reason and practical justice, which has been 
evolved by the Courts. It is submitted that the Court 
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can and should adopt the foUowing principles in working 
out a practical application of rSection 15-8-104: 
(a) There is a presumption in favor of the 
correctness of the determination arrived at by the 
Board of Adjustment. 
Home for Hebrew Infants vs. Hand Realty 
Co., 227 N. Y. Supple. 570; 
Rev.org Realty Co. vs. \V alsh, 
232 N. Y. Supple. 141; 251 N. Y. 516; 
Re Dawson, 277 Pac. (Okla.) 226; 
Bellofatto vs. Board of Adjustment, 
141 Atlantic 781. 
(b) To set aside a decision of a zoning board 
of adjustment it is necessary to find that its action 
has no foundation and reason and is a mere arbi-
trary or irrati,onal exercise of power, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, the pub-
lic morals, the public safety or the public welfare. 
Sundlun vs. 1/.;oning Board, 
50 R I. i08; 145 Atlantic 451; 
Dra hble vs. Zoning Board, 
52 R I. 228; 159 Atlantic 828; 
Norcrosse vs. Board, 150 N. E. (Mass.) 887; 
Zahn vs. Board, 274 U. S. i325; 
71 Law Ed. 1074; 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; 
Altschul vs. Ludwig, 
216 N. Y. 459; 111 N. E. 216; 
Nectow vs. Cambridge, 
277 U. S. 183; 72 Law Ed. 842; 
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment, 
34 Pac. (2nd) 537 (Montana); 
Allen vs. City of Patterson, 
121 Atlantic (N .• J.) 610; 
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St. Albens-Springfield Corp. vs. Connell, 
257 N. Y. 73, 80; 
People vs. Leo, 173 N. Y. Supple. 217. 
(c) The Board of Adjustment's action is 
not limited to cases where witnesses have been 
heard. Without any witnesses, it may act on its 
own knowledge, for it is made up of men with 
special qualifications of training and experience. 
Fordham Manor vs. Walsh, 
244 N.Y. 280; 155 N. E. 575; 
Levy vs. Board of Standards, 
276 N. Y. Sup. 370; 267 N. Y. 347; 196 
N. E. 284; 
People vs. Novick Co., 
283 N. Y. Supple. 762. 
4. 
The Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Is a Legally 
Created Fact Finding Body - An Administrative 
Agency-Charged with the Duty of Determining 
Whether in Any Particular Case Unusual Hardship 
Might Result If the Strict Letter of Salt Lake City's 
Zoning Ordinance Were Enforced. Its Powers Ex-
tend to: 
(A) Allowing Slight Deviations from Minor Require-
ments of the Zoning Ordinance Such as "Set-
Back", Side-Line, Lot Area, Etc. Requirements; 
And 
(B) Allowing a Non-Conforming Use of Property 
within a Zoning District When Such Use Is Not 
13 
Contrary to Public Interest and Unnecessary 
Hardship Would Result from Literal Enforce-
ment of the Ordinance. 
A. Under Section 15-8-101, R. S. 1933 the Board 
of Adjustment has the power: 
"(:3)-To authorize upon appeal such vari-
ance from the terms of the ordinance as will not 
be contrary to the public interest, where owing to 
special conditions a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnec-
essary hardship; provided that the spirit of the 
ordinance shall be observed and substantial jus-
tice done." (Italics :ours). 
The Board of Adjustment has a legal existence. 
There is no unconstitutional delegation to it of legislative 
power. 
''In practically all of them (zoning ordin-
ances) provision is made for a board with power 
on appeal to authorize, in specific cases, such 
variance from the terms of the ordinance, as will 
not be contrary to the public interest, where, 
owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement 
of the provisions of the ordinance will result in 
unnecessary hardship, and where the spirit of the 
ordinance shall be observed and substantial jus-
tice done. Such ordinances have been very gen-
erally substained upon the theory that they con-
stitute a valid exercise of the police power; that 
is to say they have a substantial bearing upon the 
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare 
of the community.'' 
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment, 
34 Pac. (2nd) Montana 537. 
14 
"In earlier days, the argument that the pow-
ers conferred upon the board amounted to an un-
lawful delegation of legislative authority would 
have demanded serious consideration. In the light 
of a group of comparatively recent decisions 
where that subject has been discussed fully, there 
can no longer be serious doubt that in this par-
ticular the statute does not violate the Consti-
tution. Th,is is true even though the board is 
given the power to change on the terms stated 
in the statute the bou,ndaries of the several dis-
tricts or zones established by the legislatu.re it-
self." (Italics ours). 
Bradley vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 
255 Mass. 160: 150 N. E. 892. 
"Undoubtedly the legislature must declare 
the policy of the law and fix the legal principles 
which are to control in given cases; but an ad-
ministrative body may be invested with the power 
to ascertain the fads and conditions to which the 
polieies and prineiples apply. If this could not 
be done there would be infinite confusion in the 
laws, and in an effort to detail and particularize, 
they must miss sufficiently, both in provision and 
execution.'' 
Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 236 U. ~s. 230; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390. 
"In this case 93-1-4 * * * placed an 
excise tax on the sale of cigarettes. It was a 
function peculiarly within the province of the 
Legislature. The matter of administration was 
placed with the Tax Commission, a power proper 
to give it. The matter of fixing a penalty for 
nonpayment of the tax or for failure to affix 
stamps was a matter which the Legislature had 
plenary power to deal with. The duty of deter-
mining whether there was such failure was given 
to the administrative body, a function which the 
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Legislature may itself perform or give to an 
administrative body. So far, the functions given 
to the Tax Commission were entirely proper 
for the Legislature to delegate. It was not a 
delegation of essential legislative powers, but of 
powers to carry into effect the expression of the 
Legislative will." 
Tite vs. State Tax Commission, 
57 Pac. (2nd) Page 738. 
"We see no distinction in principle between 
the usc of a fact finding body for determining 
whether or not 'unusual hardships' have resulted 
in specific cases and the use of a similar admin-
istrative agency to ascertain the fact whether a 
picture film is of a moral, educational or harmless 
character. ~ianifestly, since unusual hardships 
would affect some and not other owners in a 
zoning district, the detennination whether the 
restriction imposes unusual hardships upon an 
individual's property must be left, in specific in-
stances, to the discretion of administrative agen-
cies, but even so the power conferred upon them 
cannot be unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised." 
L. and ~L Investment Co. vs. Cutler, 
125 Ohio State 12; 180 N. E. 379; 86 
A. L. R. at 714; 
N ectow vs. Cambridge, 
277 U. S. 183; 72 Law Ed. 842; 
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner, 
125 Misccl. 526; 211 N. Y. 'Supple. 470; 
Dowsey vs. Kensington, 
257 N. Y. 221; 177 N. E. 427; 86 A. L. 
R. 642; 
Spencer-Sturla Co. vs. Memphis, 
290 S. vV. (Tenn.) 614; 
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McCord vs. Ed. Bond & C. Co., 
175 Georgia 667; 165 S. E. 590; 86 
A. L. R. 704; 
Red "C" Oil Co. vs. Board of Agriculture, 
222 U.S. 380; 56 Law Ed. 240; 
Construction Co. vs. Jackson, 
152 Maryland 671; 137 Atlantic 278; 
In re Daws•on, 277 Pac. (Okla.) 226; 
Facey vs. Leo, et al., 
230 N.Y. 602; 130 N. E. 910; 
Weaver vs. Bishop, 52 Pac. (2nd) 867; 
Tau Alpha Holding Corp. vs. Board of Ad-
justment, 171 Southern (Fla.) 819. 
These authorities conclusively sustain the proposi-
tions (a) that the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake is 
a legal existing body; (b) that there is no unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to it in empowering 
it to authorize variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance, not contrary to public interest in order to 
avoid unnecessary hardship in particular cases and (c) 
that such valid delegation of power includes the au-
thority to authorize a non-conforming use in a particular 
zoning district. 
It has been indicated very strongly in decisions 
upholding the validity of zoning ordinances that such 
enactments are saved from the condemnation of uncon-
stitutionality because they had created a board of 
adjustment vested with powers to relieve against un-
reasonable limitations upon full use and enjoyment of 
property. 
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"In the absence .of such a board vested with 
power to prevent the inequalities and injustices 
which might otherwise result from strict enforce-
ment of the zoning· ordinance there would be grave 
doubts as to the constituti,onality of the ordin-
anee.'' 
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment, (supra) ; 
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner, (supra). 
The case of State ex rel. Presbyterian Church vs. 
Edgecomb, 108 Neb. 857; 189 N. W. 617 illustrates the 
fate of a zoning ordinance that did not contain a pro-
vision creating a board of adjustment empowered to 
relieve against "unnecessary hardship". It was de-
clared invalid by the Court, but Metzenbaum in his Law 
of Zoning affirms that had the ordinance made provision 
for adjustments through an administrative board that 
it would not have been voided. 
B. Under Section 15-8-101, R. S. 1933 the Board of 
Adjustment is authorized to permit a non-conforming 
use of a particular traet or parcel of land within a 
district. The Board may "authorize * * * such variance 
front the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary 
to public interest where owing to special conditions a 
literal enforcement • • • will result in unnecessary hard-
ship.'' 
What is a "variance" which may be granted by the 
Board? The word "variance" is defined: 
"A material difference" (in pleading and 
proof). Davidson Grocery Co. vs .• Johnston, 24 
ldaho :3:36; 1:~:3 Pacific 929. 
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"A substantial departure" (in pleading and 
proof). Sposedo vs. Merriam, 111 Maine 530; 
90 Atlantic 387. 
''Difference' '-Roget 's Thesaurus (American 
Edition) page 5. 
"Change of condition; deviation; alteration". 
Webster's New International Dictionary. 
The word "variance" is not a weak word; it has 
vitality and strength. There is no meaning of minimum 
change or limited adjustment conveyed by its use; op-
positely, it carries the sense of "material difference" 
and "change of condition". There is nothing in the text 
of Section 15-8-101 that requires that the word "var-
iance" bear other than its usual and ordinary meaning. 
The section declares that "the spirit of the ordinance 
be observed and substantial justice be done". This 
phrase strongly suggests that the "variances" to be 
granted are such changes and deviations as will ensure 
"substantial justice" to all c;oncerned. The statute in 
no manner suggests that the "variances" allowable are 
only minor ones such as shortening the ''set back'' or 
"side line" requirements. The Montana Supreme Court 
in the Freeman case has well covered this point: 
"In this eonneetion it is suggested that the 
variation which the hoard has the power to make 
refers only to slight variations, sneh as the 
heighth of buildings, or the distance it must be 
from the street, etc. \V e find little merit in this 
contention. Obviously the legislature could not 
fix any definite rule that would fit every incli-
vidual case of alleged hardship. The authority 
conferred upon the hoard, was of necessity of a 
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general nature and discretionary. The language 
u,scd in the provision of the statute and of the 
ord'inancc is broad a;nd general. (Italics ours). 
It confers on the board considerable latitude for 
the exercise of its discretion in any particular 
case.'' 
See also: 
'Weaver vs. Bishop, 52 Pac. (2nd) 869; 
Tau Alpha Holding Corp. vs. Board, 
171 Southern (Fla.) 819. 
We suggest that the narr,ow construction placed on 
this section by Appellant's counsel reflects the early 
zoning decisions as they related to the validity of powers 
delegated to the boards of adjustment. There was doubt 
in the minds of the courts as to whether or not legislative 
powers were delegated to the Board, and in order to 
sustain the Board and its authority (and thereby save 
the zoning laws and ordinances) the Courts displayed 
a tendency to limit the powers of the Board to making 
of minor adjustments. As the full scope of the zoning 
laws developed and the Oourts more completely sensed 
the necessity of endowing the administrative board with 
vigorous power and authority, we witness an evolution 
characteristic of the Common Law. Instead of leaving 
the Board a mere "face saver" for the zoning law, the 
Courts rec-ognized the actualities and problems in en-
forcing a zoning ordinance. There is necessity of allow-
ing non-conforming uses in a district. If the Board were 
not permitted to grant them the whole zoning structure 
is imperiled. As grave injustices and hardships can be 
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inflicted upon a pr,operty owner m denying him a non-
conforming use as in refusing him a minor adjustment-
in fact the hardships would probably be more severe. 
The courts have now declared that the legislature can 
empower a Board of Adjustment to allow non-comf,orm-
ing uses, and that such delegated power is not legislative, 
but simply a "fact finding" function and part of the 
administrative duties of the Board. Hence the "var-
iance'' that the Board can order must not be limited to 
those minor changes and alterations urged by Appel-
lants, but must of necessity be as broad as the power 
granted. The statute does not justify a narrow con-
struction. ''The language used in the provision of the 
statute and of the ordinance is broad and general." 
Appellants stress the distinetion between the powers 
granted the "legislative body'' (Salt Lake City Com-
mission) and the powers ·Conferred upon the Board of 
Adjustment by the Utah zoning law, and art,rue that if 
the powers granted to the Board of Adjustment includes 
that of granting a non-conforming use in a given zoning 
district that the "Board of Adjustment may in effect 
repeal'' the zoning ordinance in whole or in part as to 
a particular district. This argument ignores the limita-
tions and restrictions contained in sub-paragraph (3) 
of Sec. 15-8-101. The "variance" which may be author-
ized must be one (a) "not contrary to public interest;" 
(b) "special conditions" must produce "unnecessary 
hardship" owing to a "literal enforcement" of the 
ordinance; (c) the "spirit of the ordinance shall be 
observed" and (d) "substantial justice" must be done. 
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These oonditions upon which the Board's grant of a 
"variance" must be based certainly prevent the Board 
from "repealing" the ordinance or altering it to any 
great extent. Any action by the Board is subject to 
review by the Courts. It is definitely limited in the 
exercise of the power to grant "variances". In the case 
at bar the "variance" granted is well within the four 
limitations of the statute. The "use" granted Tracy 
Loan and Trust Company for its lot, prevents an "un-
necessary hardship"; it does "substantial justice" and 
yet observes the "spirit of the ordinance". 
5. 
The Board of Adjustment Exercised Its Power in a Legal 
.Manner; Did Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously, and 
Rightfully Relieved Respondent, Tracy Loan and Trust 
Company from Suffering Unnecessary Hardship Caused 
by a Literal Enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance. 
A. Respondents submit that they have established 
the following principles which must govern the Courts 
in considering the order of variance of the Board of 
Adjustment: 
(a) There is a presumption in favor of the 
correctness of the determination arrived at by the 
Board of Adjustment. (See Section 3, Subdi-
vision C, Paragraph (a) of this brief). 
(b) To set aside a decision of a zoning board 
of adjustment it is necessary to find that its 
action has no foundation and reason, and is a 
mere arbitrary and irrational exercise of power, 
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having no substantial relation to the public health, 
the public morals, the public safety or the public 
welfare. (See Section 3, Subdivision C, paragraph 
(b) of this brief). 
Prima facie, therefore the Board's order must be 
accepted, unless it appears to be the result of capricious 
or arbitrary conduct. Was the Board guilty of such 
conduct, ,on the evidence submitted at the trial of the 
"plenary action"~ The Board's order must be based 
on facts that show: 
1. Special conditions existed which would 
result in inflicting on Respondent, Tracy Loan 
and Trust Company unnecessary hardship if the 
zoning' ordinance were literally enforced. 
2. 'fhat by granting the variance substan-
tial jnstice was done. 
3. That the spirit of the 'ordinance was ob-
served and the granting of the variance was not 
contrary to public interest. 
1. Special condit,ions existed which would result in 
inflicting on Respondent, Tracy Loan and Trust Com-
pany u;nnecessary hardship if the zoning ordinance were 
literally enf arced. 
A. The property of Respondent, 'fracy l.1oan and 
Trust Company (hereafter designated Tracy property) 
is a vacant lot. The bouse formerly located on it was 
demolished under pressure of the City. (Appellant's 
Abstract pgs. 57-58) The property immediately north 
of the Tracy property is occupied by a dilapidated shack 
highly detrimental to the neighborhood. (Appellant's 
abstract pgs. 31 and 32). 
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B. Diagonally across the street from the Tracy 
property and east of the Walton properties is loeated 
Dickinson's Grocery Store and Vetter's Meat Market. 
Delivery trucks at certain hours of the day are backed 
up in front of the store and the market. (Respondent's 
Abstract pg. 3) 
C. At the intersection of South 8th East Street and 
Ear,;t 2nd South 1Street (a bloek east of the Tracy prop-
erty) are located a r,;ervice ,station on one corner, an 
ice cream manufacturer on another corner and a grocery 
(Lucas) store next to the south-east corner. This is a 
commercial or business intersection. (Respondent's Ab-
stract pg. 33) 
D. A survey of East 2nd South and South 7th East 
Streets for a block extending in all four directions 
(Transcript 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113) shows that 23 
of the houses _were occupied by owners; 15 by tenants and 
12 were occupied as apartment houses and rooming 
houses. (Transcript 114) About 50o/o of the houses are 
occupied by the owners and 50o/o occupied by tenants 
and lessees and as rooming houses. (Transcript 114) 
E. The area in which the Tracy property and the 
properties of Appellants are located is no longer a resi-
dential district-as a residential district it is largely 
a thing of the past. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 18) It 
is a rental district and does not lend itself to residential 
purposes. (Respondent's Abstract 19) It is an old time 
residential district invaded by tenancy people. (Respond-
ent's Abstract pg. 20) 
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F. The houses m the neighborhood were built 
around 30 years ago. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 11) 
G. The Appellant Walton's properties consist of 
his home and apartments and multi-family dwellings 
owned and operated by him for income purposes. (Ap-
pellant's Transcript pgs. 44 and 45) 
H. Neither the owners of the property on the east 
(Halloran) nor •on the north (Simonds) of the Tracy 
property have objected to the variance granted. (Ap-
pellant's Abstract 64; Transcript pgs. 96 and 99) 
I. The Tracy property does not lend itself for 
investment for resident purposes (Respondent's Ab-
stract pg. 19) nor would it yield an income for private 
residential purposes because the ground value plus the 
cost of a private rental residence would put the cost 
out of line; a man who would pay $6,000.00 for a house 
would not buy it in this district because it is an old 
time residence district invaded by tenancy people. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20) The demand is for 
modern houses in a district protected by building re-
strictions in the deeds. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20) 
There has been but •one new residence erected in this 
district two blocks east of the Tracy property. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pg. 21) The Tracy property must 
be used as a business rental property. (Respondent's 
Abstract pg. 23) It would not be economically sound 
to build an apartment house for the reason rents have 
not raised to the level they were before the depression. 
(Respondent's Abstract pgs. 23, 35, 36) It would be 
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next to impossible to sell the Tracy property for resi-
dential purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 34) The 
Tracy property can be sold for about $4,000.00 and that 
is its going value but not for residence purposes because 
at that value a buyer would want Federal Heights or 
east bench property. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19) 
2. That by granting the variance substantial justice 
was done. 
A. The area surrounding the Tracy property as 
residential district is largely a thing of the past. (Ap-
pellant's witness, Peterson; Respondent's Abstract pg. 
18) It is an old time residence district invaded by ten-
ancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20) It would 
be next to impossible to sell the Tracy property for 
residence purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 34) 
B. The construction and operation of a service 
station on the Tracy property would not depreciate the 
values of the properties of the several appellants. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pgs. 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31) 
3. That the spirit of the Ordinance was observed 
and the granting of the varian.ce was not contrary to 
public interest. 
A. East Second South and :South 7th East Streets 
are each 10 rods wide. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 7) 
These streets are paved and the bus has replaced the 
street car on East 2nd South Street. (Appellant's Ab-
stract pg. 54) 
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B. .Service stations are today kept clean and lighted 
and the air space is better. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 
28 and 30) 
The above summary of the evidence upon which the 
trial court made its Findings justifies the conclusion 
that the Board of Adjustment acted fairly and justly 
and its order of variance was not an arbitrary act, but 
one that met all of the requirements of the statute. 
6. 
The Area of Salt Lake City in and about the Intersection 
of East 2nd South Street and South 7th East Street Is 
No Longer An Area Constituting An Exclusive Resi-
dential Section of Said City (8th Finding of Fact; Ap-
pellants' Assignment No. 1). 
The evidence abundantly sustains this Finding. 
(a) Appellants witness Pett~rsm1 was asked: 
"In ,other words, Mr. Peterson, isn't it a fact, 
that up in that territory as a residential district, 
it is largely a thing of the past~'' He replied: 
"Yes, I ·would say it is." (Respondent's Abstract 
pg. 18) 
(b) Respondent's witness Gaddis testified: 
"It is more or less a rental uistrid, and the price, 
on account of the price, I don't think it lends itself 
to residential purposes. It is an old time resi-
dence district invaded by tenancy people. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20) 
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(e) Respondent's witness \V eeks testified: 
"It (Tracy property) would be next to impossible 
to sell it for residential purposes." 
(d) Respondent's witness Kipp testified 
that in this area 2:3 of the houses were occupied 
by owners; 15 by tenants and 12 were oceupied 
as apartment houses and rooming houses. About 
50% of the houses are occupied by the owners 
and 50;Yo occupied by tenants, and lessees and as 
rooming houses. (Transcript pgs. 108 to 114 in-
clusive) Appellant's Abstract does not correctly 
reflect Kipp 's testimony. 
(e) A grocery store and meat market oc-
cupies the southwest corner of the intersection 
immediately east ·Of the ~Walton property. ( Re-
spondent's Abstract pg. 3) 
7. 
The Tracy Property Cannot Be Sold for Residential Pur-
poses and That Respondent Tracy J.oan and Trust 
Co. Cannot Secure a Reasonable Income Therefrom and 
Unless Permitted to Use the Same for Commercial 
Purposes Its Value Will Be Confiscated (lOth Finding 
of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 3). 
This Finding is supported by substantial testimony. 
(a) The area in which the Tracy property 
is located is no longer a residential district-as 
a residential district it is largely a thing of the 
past. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 18) It is a 
rental district and does not lend itself to resi-
dential purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19) 
It is an old time residential district invaded by 
tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20) 
The houses in the neighborhood were built around 
30 years ago. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 11) 
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(b) It_ would be next to impossible to sell 
the Tracy property for residence purposes. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pg. 34) 
(c) The Tracy property does not lend itself 
for investment for resident purposes. (Respond-
ent's Abstract pg. 19) It would not yield an in-
come for private residential purposes because the 
ground value plus the cost of a private rental 
residence would put the cost out of line. (Re-
spondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20) 
(d) The Tracy property must be used as a 
business rental property. (Respondent's Abstract 
pg. 21) It would not be economically sound to 
build an apartment house thereon (Respondent's 
Abstraet pgs. 2:1, 3;) and :36) It can be sold for 
$4,000.00 but not for residence purposes. 
8. 
That the Propos,ed Service Station to Be Erected on the 
Tracy Property Will Be Beautified and Made Sightly 
(11th Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 4). 
This Finding is justified by Gaddis' testimony at 
Respondent's Abstract pg. 28 and \V eeks testimony at 
Appellant's Abstract pgs. 63 and 64. It is submitted 
that this Finding is unimportant inasmuch as the var-
iance order of the Board of Adjustment specified no 
conditions for the ereetion of the service station. (Tran-
script pg. 95) 
9. 
That the Erection and Operation of the Service Station 
Will Not Decrease the Value of Plaintiffs' Premises or 
the Interveners' premises; nor decease Their Desir-
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ability for Residential or for Rental Purposes (13th 
and 14th Findings of Fact; Appellants' Assignment 
No.3). 
These Findings are fully supported by the evidence 
of the witnesses Gaddis and Weeks. (Respondent's Ab-
stract pgs. 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 and 31) 
10. 
That the Erection and Operation of the Proposed Service 
Station Will have a Tendency to Increase the Desir-
ability for Residential Purposes of the Premises One 
Block in Each Direction from the Tracy Property (14th 
Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 6). 
This Finding is supported by the testimony of wit-
ness \Veeks. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 30) 
11. 
That the Tracy Property Is Not Fitted for Residential Pur-
poses (14th, Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment 
No.7). 
This :F'inding has complete support from the fol-
lowing evidence : 
(a) Peterson's testimony at pg. 18 of He-
spondent's AlJstract. (Peterson appeared as a 
witness for Appellants). 
(b) Gaddis' testimony at pgs. 19, 20, 23 and 
24 Hespondent 's Abstract. 
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(c) Weeks testimony at pg-s. 31, 34. 
It is submitted that judg-ment of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
RITER & COWAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. 
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